In this paper we consider a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity in which players are endowed with variational preferences. We provide an existence result for the corresponding mixed equilibrium notion. Then we study the limit behavior of equilibria under perturbations on the indices of ambiguity aversion.
Introduction
Kajii and Ui present in [10] a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity which represents a minor departure from the standard Bayesian approach. Nevertheless, it captures significative differences with respect to the standard model. In fact, they partially follow the Harsanyi's approach as they assume that the source of uncertainty can be expressed by an underlying state space; but, at the same time, they deviate from the classical model of uncertainty since they allow for multiple priors (that are not necessarily common across agents 2 ) instead of a single common prior. Ambiguity is then resolved by assuming that players are pessimistic, that is, they evaluate an ambiguous belief by the worst expected utility possible given the set of probability distributions (multiple priors). This particular attitude towards ambiguity, known as maxmin expected utility preferences, has been axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler in [8] and commonly used in many applications. Kajii and Ui also present in [10] an equilibrium notion for their model called mixed equilibrium, which is an interim equilibrium concept where each player chooses the best mixed action for any realization of a private signal 3 ; then, they show that mixed equilibria exist under standard assumptions.
In this paper we study a generalization of the mixed equilibrium concept in which we relax the assumption imposed on the ambiguity attitudes of the players. More precisely we consider players endowed with variational preferences as introduced by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini in [13] . This class of preferences embodies the maxmin model and help to better understand the theoretical foundations of the works of Hansen and Sargent on model uncertainty in macroeconomics 4 (see [9] ). Under variational preferences, players evaluate an ambiguous belief by the worst possible value (given the set of probability distributions) assumed by the sum of the expected utility with a nonnegative function of the probabilities called index of ambiguity aversion. This index has been demonstrated to play a very important role as a measure of ambiguity aversion. For instance, maximal ambiguity aversion corresponds to index ambiguity aversion identically equal to zero and gives back maxmin preferences. While, minimal ambiguity aversion corresponds to ambiguity neutrality and gives back subjective utility preferences. The index of ambiguity aversion is lower semicontinuous but discontinuous in general. Despite this drawback, our first result shows that, in the Kajii and Ui setting of incomplete information, variational preferences are represented by continuous functions of the strategy profile. As a consequence of this result, we prove in this paper that equilibria (called MMR mixed equilibria) exist under standard assumptions.
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini show in [13] that variational preferences become more ambiguity averse as the ambiguity indices become smaller. So they point out (pp 1459-1450) that it is natural to wonder about the limit behavior of sequences of variational preferences. In particular, it is important to determine the conditions under which a sequence of variational preferences converges to the variational preference corresponding to the limit index of ambiguity aversion. In [13] , a limit result is given (Proposition 12). In this paper, we give a new result which is based on a different assumption of convergence on the sequence of indices of ambiguity aversion, namely hypographical convergence (see for instance [1] , [17] ), and guarantees the continuous convergence of sequences of variational preferences. This result has an immediate application to mixed equilibria since continuous convergence of preferences imply convergence of corresponding sequences of MMR-mixed equilibria. The problem of the limit behavior of the equilibria in games has been extensively studied in the literature (see, for instance, [7] for the standard problem, [6] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [18] , [20] for recent results under relaxed or different assumptions and references). The question whether the limit property extends to the equilibrium concepts in ambiguous games has been studied in [3] for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences (see [2] , [4] ), in [19] for an equilibrium notion for ambiguous games which relies on the Beweley unanimity rule. Finally, in [5] , we investigate the stability for the Kajii and Ui's notion of mixed equilibrium under perturbations on the set of multiple priors.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model of games under incomplete information and multiple priors, define the notion of MMR mixed equilibrium and provide the existence result. Section 3 is devoted to the stability issue; first we study the limit behavior of the variational preferences and then we apply this result to the problem of stability of MMR equilibria.
Model and equilibria
We consider a finite set of players I = {1, . . . n}. For every player i,
Denote also with X = ∏ n j=1 X j and with X −i = ∏ j̸ =i X j . Let Θ be a finite set of payoff relevant states then, player i has a payoff function f i : Ψ × Θ → R. Denote with ∆(Θ) the set all the probability distribution over Θ, then player i is endowed of a set of priors P i ⊆ ∆(Θ).
We follow the Kajii and Ui's setup in [10] . The incompleteness of information is summarized by a random signal τ = (τ i ) i∈I . When state θ ∈ Θ occurs, player i privately observes a signal τ i (θ) and then chooses a pure strategy ψ i ∈ Ψ i . Denote with T i the range of τ i , i.e. τ i : Θ → T i for every player i. A strategy of player i is a function σ i : T i → X i ; therefore, for every t i ∈ T i , σ i (t i ) is a vector in X i where each component σ i (ψ i |t i ) denotes the probability of player i choosing action ψ i when he observes t i . The set of all the strategies σ i of player i is denoted by S i ; moreover,
} be the set of conditional probability distributions once t i has been observed 5 . An updating rule Φ i :
5 Degenerate probabilities are implicitly ruled out from P i (t i ) in this formulation. That is, if P ∈ P i is such that P (τ
After t i is observed, player i uses posteriors in Φ i (t i ) to evaluate his actions. The interim payoff to a randomized action
As explained in the Introduction, in this work we deviate from the Kajii and Ui's approach, where only the pessimistic attitude towards ambiguity is taken into account. In fact, we consider more general attitudes towards ambiguity which are represented by the so called variational preferences as introduced in ( [13] ) by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini. More precisely, for every player i, we consider the following utility function 
is the corresponding game 6 . Then Definition 2.1: A strategy profile σ * ∈ S is a Maccheroni Marinacci Rustichini (MMS) mixed equilibrium for the game Γ if for every θ ∈ Θ it follows that
Now, we prove first that utility functions V i of the game Γ are continuous and then, as a consequence, we provide an existence result for MMS mixed equilibria of the game Γ .
Proposition 2.2: Assume that the set
Denote with F i the function defined by
is lower semicontinuous in its domain. So, there exists
Since, by definition, the function U i is continuous in its domain then the function F (·, ·, Q i ) is obviously continuous in X i × S −i . Then, it follows that lim sup
Being 
Given a sequence of strictly positive numbers {ε ν } ν∈N ; then, by definition, for every ν ∈ N there exists
Hence there exists a subsequence of integers {ν k } k∈N such that
The set
Then, it follows that there exists a subsequence
Hence, from (7,8), we get
, which implies (6) and concludes the proof. 2 Remark 2.3: In the previous proof, we proved directly the upper semicontinuity of the function V i . However, we could also apply the general result contained in Proposition 3.1.1 of [12] . The proof of the lower semicontinuity of V i substantially follows the standard Berge's arguments (see, for instance, Proposition 4.1.1 in [12] ).
Building upon the previous Proposition we prove the following: 
is clearly concave and the minimum of concave functions is concave. Hence the correspondence
has convex values. Now the proof follows the same steps of Proposition 1 in [10] . In fact, from the previous results it immediately follows that the correspondence
is upper semicontinuous with not empty, compact and convex images. So it is the best reply correspondence
Hence the correspondence σ ∏ i∈I B i (σ) satisfies the Kakutani fixed point theorem. Since a fixed point σ for ∏ i∈I B i is clearly a MMR mixed equilibrium then we get the assertion.2
Stability Problem statement
For every player i, consider a sequence {c i,ν } ν∈N of indices of ambiguity aversion, the corresponding sequences of utility functions {V i,ν } ν∈N and the corresponding sequence of games 7 {Γ ν } ν∈N . where
In this section we look for conditions of convergence of the sequences {c i,ν } ν∈N to the indices of ambiguity aversion c i for i = 1, . . . , n, which guarantee that:
i) The corresponding sequences of variational preferences {V i,ν } ν∈N converge in an appropriate way to the variational preferences V i corresponding to c i , for i = 1, . . . , n.
ii) Converging sequences of equilibria of the perturbed games {Γ ν } ν∈N have their limits in the set of equilibria of the unperturbed game Γ corresponding to the variational preferences V i , for i = 1, . . . , n.
Technical tools
Definition 3.1: Given a sequence of functions {f ν } ν∈N , with
ii) For every z ∈ Z and for every sequence {z ν } ν∈N ⊂ Z converging to z it follows that
Moreover, the sequence of functions {f ν } ν∈N epiconverges to the function f if the sequence of functions {−f ν } ν∈N hypoconverges to the function −f . Definition 3.2: Given a sequence of functions {f ν } ν∈N , with f ν : Z ⊆ R k → R for every ν ∈ N. Then {f ν } ν∈N continuously converges to the function f if it hypoconverges and epiconverges to f , that is for every z ∈ Z and for every sequence {z ν } ν∈N ⊂ Z converging to z it follows that 
Results

Proposition
Denote with F i and F i,ν the functions defined respectively by
Let Q i be such that
Let {Q i,ν } ν∈Φ i (t i ) be a sequence such that
Therefore (10) is satisfied.
Suppose that (11) doesn't hold, that is lim inf
and { Q i,ν } ν∈Φ i (t i ) be a sequence such that
Then, there exists a subsequence
On the other hand, since {c i,ν } ν∈N hypoconverges to c i , it follows that The following result follows easily from the previous Proposition: (c 1 , . . . , c n ) . Assume that {Γ ν } ν∈N is a sequence of games defined by (9) 
